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I. INTRODUCTION
"Human beings, drunk or sober are responsible for their own torts."
1
Traditionally the common law has been loathe to impose a duty of
care on a third party to help another individual in danger, even where
such assistance would not be a source of inconvenience to the helper.
2
Although there is no general duty to act, certain relationships may give
rise to a duty of care. This Article examines whether the relationship
between publican and patron should or should not produce such an
obligation. It also addresses the possible defenses to such a claim in the
tort of negligence. Finally, as the matter is not a settled point of Irish
law, this Article also attempts to assess the potential approach of its
courts, in view of the approach taken by the English courts to the issue
and the flurry of academic comment in the wake of a recent Irish
settlement.4  These issues are certain to surface in litigation again.5
Regardless of the approach taken by the Irish courts, the impact of any
resolution will have dramatic consequences on Irish society and culture.
II. TRADITIONAL PRINCIPLES OF PUBLICAN LIABILITY
A. On the Premises-A Clear Picture
Under Irish common law and statute,6 a publican is under a duty of
care to look after the safety of all his customers, intoxicated and sober
alike. This duty applies "in respect of activities and accidents that
happen on a premises, relating to the physical condition of the premises
and the acts of other customers."7 In Hall v. Kennedy and Rudledge t/a
The White House,8 Judge Morris stated that the publican's obligation is
1. Meege v. United States, 344 F.2d 31, 32 (6th Cir. 1965) (citing State for Use of
Joyce v. Hatfield, 78 A.2d 754, 756 (Md. 1951). See also W. PAGE KEETON ET AL.,
PROSSER AND KEETON ON THE LAW OF TORTS § 32, at 178 n.41 (West Publishing, 5th ed.
1984) [hereinafter PROSSER & KEETON].
2. See, e.g., PROSSER & KEETON, supra note 1, § 53.
3. For example, employer and employee; schoolmaster and pupil; and, occupier and
visitor. Clearly, the element of control is a special factor in these relationships. See id. § 56.
4. See Murphy v. Ballyclough Co-operative Creamery Ltd., [1998] No.
1993/5528, T.E.H.C. 197 (Feb. 27, 1998) (Ir.) [hereinafter Murphy].
5. See RAYMOND BYRNE & WILLIAM BINCHY, ANNUAL REVIEW OF IRISH LAW
1998 610 (Round Hall 1999) [hereinafter BYRNE & BINCHY].
6. See Occupiers' Liability Act, 1995 available at http://193.120.124.98/1995_10 .html(last visited Sept. 25, 2002) [hereinafter Occupiers' Liability Act].
7. Mark Dunne, Publicans' Liability for Injuries Off the Premises, 5 IR. BAR REV.
152 (1999).
8. Hall v. Kennedy and Rutledge t/a, The White House, [1990] No. 1786 p (Ir. H.
Ct. Dec. 20, 1993) (LEXIS transcript).
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to "take all reasonable care for the safety [of the patron] while on the
premises. This would include in this case ensuring that a customer in the
premises did not assault him." 9 In Kennedy, the plaintiff's action against
the second named defendant (the bar owner) failed because the behavior
of the first named defendant, who brutally attacked the plaintiff with a
glass, disclosed nothing of his violent intentions.' 0 The court held that it
would have been unforeseeable on the part of the bar staff to have
anticipated such an incident.' I Thus, the knowledge of the bar staff was
a crucial element in this case.
In Murphy v. O'Brien,12 the plaintiff, who at the time was intoxicated,
fell from the lowest step of a stairs which led to the ladies' toilets in the
defendants' public house.' 3 The handrail did not project far enough to
allow a person to maintain a steady course on the last step. 14  The
plaintiff, who "had plenty to drink" elsewhere,' 5 was helped into the bar
by friends. The group of friends were admitted into the bar by the
defendant bar owner, and the party was served with drinks, but it was
uncertain whether the plaintiff herself purchased or consumed any
alcohol on the premises. 6 Judge Sheridan imposed liability, not under
the principle of occupiers' liability, but on the basis of Donoghue v.
Stevenson,17 as the plaintiff was a prospective customer.' 8 Justice Lavan
reached a similar conclusion in Walsh v. Ryan,19 citing both the "neighbor
principle" of Lord Atkin in Donoghue v. Stevenson (specifically referring to
Murphy v. O'Brien), or alternatively finding for the plaintiff on the basis
of occupiers' liability.20
9. Id. at 5.
10. See id.
11. See id.
12. Murphy v. O'Brien, [1987], Ir. L.T.R. (ns) 75 (Cir. Ct. of Ir., Sheridan, J.)
[hereinafter Murphy v. O'Brien], noted in BRYAN MCMAHON & WILLIAM BINCHY, A
CASEBOOK ON THE IRISH LAW OF TORTS 79 (2nd ed. 1992) [hereinafter MCMAHON &
BINCHY, CASEBOOK].
13. MCMAHON & BINCHY, CASEBOOK, supra note 12, at 79.
14. Id.
15. Id.
16. See BRYAN MCMAHON & WILLIAM BINCHY, LAW OF TORTS § 8.08 (2nd ed.
2000) [hereinafter MCMAHON & BINCHY].
17. Donaghue v. Stevenson, [1932] A.C. 562 (Scot.) [hereinafter Donoghue v.
Stevenson] (3-2 decision). (the defendant manufacturer was held to be under a legal duty
to the appellant consumer to take reasonable care that the manufactured article was free
from defect likely to cause injury to health. Id.).
18. MCMAHON & BINCHY, CASEBOOK, supra note 12, at 80.
19. Walsh v. Ryan, [1989] No. 10535p (Ir. H. Ct. Feb. 12, 1993) (LEXIS transcript).
20. Id. at 8.
The Occupiers' Liability Act was introduced in 1995 to address the
problems and widespread confusion that had arisen in the area. The
coalition government in power at that time in Ireland also came under
pressure from landowners to clarify matters, because, in reality, the
common law duty of care owed to trespassers seemed to be of a higher
standard than that due to invitees and licensees.2' Under the Occupiers'
22Liability Act of 1995, a duty is owed by the occupier to visitors,
recreational users,23 and trespassers.2 4 The duty owed by the occupier,
who exercises control over the premises to the visitor, requires that when
an entrant who is present on the premises at the invitation or with the
permission of the occupier, is shown the common law duty of care. This
duty is defined as reasonable care in the circumstances to ensure that a
visitor does not suffer injury or damage by reason of any danger existing
on the property. Consequently, the publican's duty to look after patrons
on the premises is indisputable.
B. Off the Premises-The Going Gets Murky
Currently, Irish law with respect to a publican's liability where
accidents occur off the premises and involve an intoxicated patron is
unclear. Despite the frequency of alcohol-related accidents in Ireland, it
has been suggested by one commentator that the law remains unsettled
due to the fear of pub owners and insurance companies that Irish courts
will set a precedent similar to "their Canadian and Australian brethren.,
25
As a result, "publican liability" litigation is customarily settled prior to
court level adjudication. For example, a case that was settled prior to a
21. See Purtill v. Athlone Urban Dist. Council, [1968] IR 205. See also
McNamara v. Electricity Supply Bd., [1975] IR I (holding that the standard of care owed
to trespassers was held to be one of "reasonable care." However, the duty owed by the
occupier to the licensee was to warn him of "concealed dangers"; the occupier was under
a duty to warn an invitee of "unusual dangers" on the premises).
22. Occupiers' Liability Act § 3(1)-(2) ("to take such care as is reasonable in the
circumstances . . . to ensure that a visitor to the premises does not suffer injury or
damage by reason of any danger existing thereon.").
23. Occupiers' Liability Act § 4(l)(a)-(b). Cf MCMAHON & BINCHY, supra note
16, § 12.65. The occupier must take care not to injure the recreational user intentionally
or with reckless disregard for this recreational user. Id.
24. Occupiers' Liability Act § 4(l)(a)-(b). Cf MCMAHON & BINCHY, supra note
16, § 12.65. The occupier is under a duty to ensure that he does not injure the trespasser
intentionally or act with reckless disregard for this trespasser. Id.
25. Dunne, supra note 7, at 152. In these jurisdictions, the courts have held that a
pub or hotel owner owes a duty of care to an intoxicated patron and may be liable for
injuries sustained off the premises as a result of his drunkenness. Id. The leading
Canadian decision is Jordan House Ltd. v. Menow & Honsberger, [1973] 38 D.L.R. 3d
105; cf Schmidt v. Sharpe, [1983] (1983) 21 A.C.W.S. 2d 96; Stewart v. Pettie, [1995]
I S.C.R 131. The leading Australian decision is Johns v. Cosgrove, [1997], 27 M.V.R.
110 (Austl.).
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hearing, Murphy v. Ballyclough Co-operative Creamery Ltd. ,26 "sparked
a public debate in Ireland over the "duties a publican owes, or should
owe, to patrons. 27 Mr. Murphy attended a shareholders' meeting of the
creamery in Mallow, Co. Cork.28 He had parked his car at a nearby
racecourse and taken a bus into Mallow town.29 Following that meeting
(at which free alcoholic beverages were provided), he went to the
Roundabout Tavern in Mallow, where he consumed "a considerable
amount of drink and became inebriated., 30 He was then driven by Mrs.
Kay Napier to his van at the racecourse "as it was raining heavily on the
night."'3' The plaintiff then drove to the Duhollow Lodge Hotel where
he was served one drink, although he was initially refused service
because of his intoxicated condition.32 On his way home, he crashed his
van into a wall and, as a result, he sustained injuries that rendered him a
paraplegic.33 In his suit against the Duhollow Lodge Hotel, the plaintiff
claimed that the last publican was negligent in serving him when he had
knowledge or ought to have had knowledge that the plaintiff was already
intoxicated and, consequently the publican was "wholly or partly to
blame for the accident. 34 In his opinion, Judge Morris stated:
It may well be that any negligence.. .on the part of the first and second-named
defendant[s] [The Roundabout Tavern owners, William and Kay Napier] in
providing alcohol to the plaintiff would have been overwhelmed by the alleged
negligence of the remaining defendants [Edward and Mary Canny, owners of
the Duhollow Lodge Hotel] if established. 5
As it is noted in McMahon and Binchy's work, the judge was not
adverse to the imposition of liability on a publican for supplying too
much drink to a customer who later crashes his car. 36 The courts also
await a case where the intoxicated is the perpetrator, rather than the
victim of harm. To attempt to foresee how the Irish judiciary might
26. Murphy, supra note 4.
27. Kathleen Moore-Walsh, The Roundabout Tavern Settlement: A Reflection of
American Publican Liability?, 13 IR. L. TIMES (NS) 205 (2000).
28. See id. at 205.
29. Id.
30. Man sues publicans for letting him drive when drunk, IRISH TIMES, Oct. 14,
1998, at 4.
31. Catherine Cleary, Insurers put on pressure to settle case, says publican, IRISH
TIMES, Oct. 15, 1998, at 7.
32. Moore-Walsh, supra note 27, at 205.
33. See id. at 206.
34. MCMAHON & BINCHY CASEBOOK, supra note 12, at 174.
35. Murphy, supra note 4, at 8.
36. MCMAHON & BINCHY CASEBOOK, supra note 12, at 174.
decide a case such as Murphy, the approach of the courts in the United
Kingdom is worthy of consideration.
C. The English Position
A number of pertinent cases have come before the English courts
recently and, interestingly, contributory negligence was a factor used in
the resolution of each. The most recent decisions have retreated from
the joint Australian and Canadian view, which focuses on the knowledge
of the publican and foreseeability of harm.37
The case of Barrett v. Ministry of Defense38 concerned a naval airman
(Barrett), who had been posted to a remote British base in Northern
Norway. Cheap alcohol was freely available on the base.39 Senior officers
routinely failed to take appropriate steps to curb excessive drinking,
although such measures were outlined in naval codes of discipline. 40 On
the night in question, Barrett was celebrating both his birthday and a
promotion. 41 He drank himself into a stupor, became unconscious, and
was removed by officers to his bunk.42 No medical attention was sought
by the officers on duty, and although they checked on him a number of
times throughout the night, he nevertheless asphyxiated on his own
vomit.4 3 The decedent's wife sued the Ministry of Defense for failing to
prevent Barrett from becoming drunk and for failing to protect him once
he became drunk.44 The Court of Appeal overturned the trial judge's
finding that the defendants owed a duty of care to the deceased to
37. Dunne, supra note 7, at 156-57.
38. Barrett v. Ministry of Def., I W.L.R. 1217 (C.A. 1995) [hereinafter Barrett].
39. Id. at 1220.
40. See id. at 1220. The senior naval officer at the base was charged with and
pleaded guilty to a breach of Queen's Regulations for the Royal Navy 1967 art. 1810,
which provides:
It is the particular duty of all officers, fleet chief petty officers, chief petty
officers, petty officers and leading ratings actively to discourage drunkenness,
overindulgence in alcohol and drug abuse by naval personnel both on board
and ashore. Should a man appear to be suffering from any of these abuses they
are immediately to take appropriate action to prevent any likely breaches of
discipline, possible injury or fatality, including medical assistance if it is
available. Action taken is to be reported to the officer of the watch/officer of
the day, naval provost unit or other naval authority as appropriate.
Id., noted in Barrett, supra note 38, at 1220.
41. Barrett, supra note 38, at 1221.
42. See id. at 1222.
43. Id.
44. Barbara Harvey & John Marston, Intoxication and claimants in negligence,
149 NEW. L.J. 1004, 1005 (1999). Judge Phelan, sitting as a judge of the High Court [of
England and Wales] in the Queen's Bench Division, gave judgment for the plaintiff for
£160,651.16. He reduced the damages of £214,201.54 by twenty-five percent, which he
held was the deceased's share of responsibility for his death. The defendant appealed the
decision, noted in Barrett, supra note 38, at 1219.
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prevent him from becoming drunk.45  In his opinion, Lord Justice
Beldam referred to existing categories of relationships in which a duty of
care already existed, such as employer and employee, pupil and
schoolmaster; and, occupier and visitor.46 He reasoned:
The characteristic which distinguishes these relationships is reliance expressed
or implied in the relationship which the party to whom the duty is owed is
entitled to place on the other party to make provision for his safety. I can see no
reason why it should not be fair, just and reasonable for the law to leave a
responsible adult to assume responsibility for his own actions in consuming
alcoholic drink.47
An "unwarranted contravention of the principle of individual responsibility
48
would arise from imposing a duty of care on the defendants to control
the plaintiff's drinking. Lord Justice Beldam claimed:
No one is better placed to judge the amount that he can safely consume or to
exercise control in his own interest as well as in the interest of others. To dilute
self-responsibility and to blame one adult for another's lack of self-control is
neither just nor reasonable and in the development of the law of negligence an
increment too far.49
Despite this view, the defendants were found liable for failing to
discharge properly the duty they owed to the deceased when they
assumed responsibility for him after he became unconscious, as "the
measures taken fell short of the standard to be reasonably expected. 5 °
The level of contributory negligence was increased from one quarter to
two-thirds. 5'
Another case involving the Ministry of Defense and intoxicated servicemen
recently came before the English courts. In Jebson v. Ministry of
Defense,52 the plaintiff soldier was returning in an army lorry from a
night out organized by a commanding officer. During this journey, the
intoxicated plaintiff had fallen from the tailgate of the lorry after
attempting to climb onto its roof.53 The Court of Appeal found that
because the defendants had organized transport for the soldiers with the
45. Barrett, supra note 38, at 1226.
46. Id. at 1224.
47. Id.
48. Claire McIvor, Liability in Respect of the Intoxicated, 60 CAMBRIDGE L.J. 109,
118(2001).
49. Barrett, supra note 38, at 1224.
50. Id. at 1225.
51. Id.
52. Jebson v. Ministry of Def., I W.L.R. 2055 (C.A. 2000) [hereinafter Jebson].
53. See id. at 2055.
knowledge that they would become intoxicated on the night out, the
defendants had assumed a duty of care to the claimant and his fellow
soldiers.54  Thus, a failure to supervise the men while in the lorry,
coupled with the foreseeability of injury as a result of the drunken
soldiers, meant that the defendants had not discharged this duty fully.55
Lord Justice Potter's judgment echoed that of Lord Justice Beldam in
Barrett: Ordinarily an adult's inebriated state would not impose a duty
of care on others to look after him. 56 But in some cases such a duty
might exist:
[Tihe law recognizes that there may be circumstances where by reason of
drunkenness or other factors foreseeably likely to affect an adult's appreciation
of danger, he may act in a childish or reckless fashion, and that in appropriate
circumstances there may exist a duty on others to make allowance for those
actions and to take precautions for the perpetrator's safety.57
This principle did not apply in Jebson because the defendants, in
providing transport for the men and knowing that they would likely be
drunk on the return journey, had already assumed a duty of care.
Although there seems to be no obligation to prevent another person
from becoming drunk, there are a number of English decisions in which
exposing the plaintiff to further harm after having provided him with
alcohol has given rise to a duty of care.58 In Brannan v. Airtours plc.,
the defendant travel company organized an evening party at a Tunisian
holiday resort.59 Plenty of free wine was provided.6° Despite warnings
made early in the evening by the travel company representative that it
was dangerous to walk across tables to get to the toilets or the dance
floor due to the presence of large electric fans at either end, the plaintiff
did so anyway. 61 Reportedly, he did this to avoid disturbing others at his
table.62 He climbed up and walked along the table and into the rotating
fan at its end, injuring his face.63 Crucially, evidence that another guest
on a previous package holiday organized by the same travel company
54. Id. at 2056.
55. Mclvor, supra note 48, at 119.
56. Jebson, supra note 52, at 2066.
57. Id. at 2067.
58. See Griffiths v. Brown, THE TIMES, Oct. 23, 1998 (Queen's Bench Division)
(Transcript: Smith Bernal) (LEXIS Professional, UK Cases, Combined Courts)[hereinafter Griffiths]. Two other important factors must be emphasized: first, the
knowledge that the plaintiff is intoxicated to such an extent that he/she is incapable of
taking proper care for his/her own safety and second, the foreseeability of the risk of
injury. Id.
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had injured himself under similar circumstances was submitted.64 The
Court of Appeal distinguished the Barrett decision, stating that in the
instant case "it was plainly foreseeable that party-goers might drink a bit
too much and lose some of their normal inhibitions and close attention to
their safety., 65 The plaintiffs contributory negligence was apportioned
at fifty percent.
66
Relationships outside of the traditional scope of publican-patron may
impose a duty of care as well. In Griffiths v. Brown, the plaintiff had
requested that a taxi driver drop him off at a certain location.67 The
plaintiff, who was inebriated but was able to walk without staggering
and give instructions to the driver, alighted from the taxi at the requested
location. The plaintiff then attempted to cross the road and was hit by a
car, sustaining serious injuries.68  The court rejected the plaintiffs
argument that the taxi driver owed him a duty of care not to let him
alight at a hazardous crossing while knowing that the plaintiff was
drunk.69 Judge Jones held, in his judgment, that "the duty of care is the
same whether the passenger is drunk or sober.,
70
Two interesting points were made in the judgment. First, if a duty of
care were to exist, it could only be "in a clear and obvious case, that is
where the passenger had plainly reached such a state of intoxication that
he was clearly incapable of taking care for his own safety.' Judge
Jones held that in the instant case, on the evidence it was not apparent to
the taxi driver that Mr. Griffiths was intoxicated.7 2 One observer opined
that had he been obviously inebriated, "a duty of care could have been
both owed and breached."73 A taxi driver, in picking up an obviously
intoxicated passenger, would be undertaking a responsibility, as the
officers were in Barrett, to look after someone who is unable to look
after himself.
Judge Jones, in making his second point, alluded to the hypothetical




67. Griffiths, supra note 58.
68. Mclvor, supra note 48, at 120.
69. See id.
70. Griffiths, supra note 58.
71. Id.
72. Id.
73. Mclvor, supra note 48, at 121.
taxi.74 If the intention of the passenger to drink was ' communicated to
the driver, and the arrangement was to take the passenger home after this
drinking session, a duty would arise to deliver the passenger safely.
75
Judge Jones concluded that the duty would arise "because of what had
been agreed or arranged and the express or implied assumption of added
responsibility by the driver."76  This same principle was applied in
Jebson, namely that a knowing arrangement to transport an intoxicated
individual gives rise to a duty of care.
III. WHAT A MESS: LEGAL INCONGRUITIES AND POLICIES IN CONFLICT
A. Control
Under the Atkinian7' approach, a defendant is liable for negligence if
his conduct results in a reasonably foreseeable injury to the plaintiff. In
other words, a duty of care must first exist for there to be a breach.
But when does a duty of care arise? Clearly, the element of control, as
the judgments in Barrett and Jebson show, is an essential factor. The
publican is exercising control over the ultimate source of danger-the
intoxicated patron. How, then, could he not be held responsible in negligence
for the dangerous article that he has put into circulation? The publican's
customers can surely be defined as his neighbors: "[P]ersons ... so
closely and directly affected by my act that I ought reasonably to have
them in contemplation as being so affected when I am directing my mind
to the acts or omissions which are called in question.,, 78 The added aspect
of control acts as a justification for the imposition of an obligation. 9
B. Vulnerability
Certain commentators also argue for the imposition of liability on the
publican on the basis that "particular relationships generate an affirmative
duty to act so as to protect a vulnerable person, even one who is the
cause of his or her own vulnerability." 80 If a publican has knowledge of




77. Donoghue v. Stevenson, supra note 17, at 571-72 (Lord Atkin's judgment, in
particular, widened the categories of the negligence, thereby establishing the "neighbor
principle": a manufacturer has a duty to take reasonable care, even if he/she does not
know the manufactured product to be dangerous and there is no contractual relationship
between him/her and the consumer. Id.).
78. Id. at 580.
79. EOIN QUILL, TORTS IN IRELAND 404 (Gill and Macmillan 1999).
80. BYRNE& BINCHY, supra note 5, at 612.
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should he not be under an obligation to take care that the customer is not
injured after having served that customer the alcohol that made him
vulnerable? In law, there is a special duty to take care of "immature or
feeble" people including the blind.8' It appears reasonable to afford
those same protections to an intoxicated person. In Ireland, the Gardaf
(Police) have already been held to owe a duty of care to an inebriated
person in their custody.82 Should the same standard not apply to publicans?
Arguments against this position state that such a duty would impose
an impractical and unreasonable obligation on the publican to keep a
tally of the amount of drink served to a particular customer or customers.83
In a quiet country pub, keeping a tally may be a relatively easy task, but
it is submitted that in a larger, busier establishment, this requirement
would be overly burdensome.
There must also be limits on a duty of care, if one is owed. Perhaps
the duty of care should be owed to those patrons who are intoxicated and
are at immediate risk of coming into or causing a dangerous situation
(for example, driving an automobile), as opposed to those patrons who
are merely intoxicated. Under this regime, overservice, in and of itself,
may not constitute a breach.84 This approach, however, may simply lead
to a different quandary than the one it resolves.
The issue of foreseeability also arises because there must be some
foreseeable risk of harm to the patron or a third party. However,
mere foreseeability of harm is not sufficient for a duty to exist under
English law. The English courts, unlike those in Ireland, have departed
from the foreseeability principles laid down in Anns v. Merton London
81. Glasgow Corp. v. Taylor [1992], A.C. 44, 67 (Scot.) (question of the
Corporation's liability for the injury suffered by a child from eating berries from a bush
growing in a public garden). In Haley v. London Electricity Board, I A.C. 778 (H.L.
1965), it was held that the respondent electricity suppliers were negligent in their duty of
care to the blind appellant. Having excavated a trench along a pavement in a London
suburb, the respondents placed a punner-hammer across the pavement to prevent access
to the trench. The appellant's stick missed the sloping handle of the punner-hammer,
which caused him to trip and fall. He sustained serious injuries. On appeal to the House
of Lords it was held that the duty owed to blind pedestrians was no different to that owed
to their seeing counterparts, even though extra precautions might have to be taken in the
case of blind persons.
82. See McKevitt v. Ireland [1987] 1 I.L.R.M. 541 (Ir. S.C.).
83. Munro v. Porthkerry Park Holiday Estates Ltd., THE TIMES, Mar. 9, 1984,
83/477 (Queen's Bench Division) (Transcript: Barnett, Lenton) (LEXIS, UK Cases,
Combined Courts) [hereinafter Munro].
84. See Barrett, supra note 38, at 1224.
• 85 • ..Borough Council, which "put foreseeability of risk at centre
stage." 6 Instead, the preference has been to follow the dicta of Judge
Brennan in the Australian case of Sutherland Shire Council v. Heyman,
87
which allows for the development of categories of negligence "by
analogy with established categories, ''88 rather than unwieldy governance
by an unlimited doctrine of foreseeability. The Irish Courts have not
strayed from the principles set forth in Anns, where the foreseeability of
harm remains an important factor in publicans' liability cases. If the
publican has overserved the patron and is, to the publican's knowledge,
intoxicated (i.e. he poses a hazard to himself and others), there exists a
reasonable foreseeability that the patron will cause an accident and
injury. Therefore, letting an intoxicated patron drive breaches the duty
of care. The stronger the reasons for believing that the patron will
actually drive home, "the stronger the case is for imposing liability on
the bar proprietor. '89 The fact that the patron has done so before without
a mishap will not absolve the publican of liability.
There are also questions of causation in relation to injuries sustained
by third parties that the Irish courts will also have to answer. Would the
intoxicated person's illegal act of drinking and driving qualify as a
sufficient novus actus interveniens thus breaking the chain of causation
between an injured pedestrian, for example, and the publican? Doubt
has been cast over this proposition because the intoxicated patron may
not have the mental capacity to perform such a novus actus
interveniens.90 Also, a publican may be held liable in negligence where
the negligence consists solely in facilitating another's intentional or
reckless act.9' Perhaps it will be more likely that an Irish court will find
a nexus between the injury to the third party and the publican's conduct.
C. Defenses
In response to the potential imposition of liability for breach of the
duty of care imposed by law, publicans can offer evidence of reasonable
precaution or the absence of duty.
85. Anns v. Merton London Borough Council, [1978] 1 A.C. 778 (H.L. 1965)
[hereinafter Anns].
86. Dunne, supra note 7, at 157.
87. Sutherland Shire Council v. Heyman, [1985] 157 C.L.R. 424.
88. Barrett, supra note 38, at 1224.
89. BYRNE & BINCHY, supra note 5, at 611.
90. See id. Novus actus interveniens (a new act intervening). The act must be
intentional or reckless.
91. Where a "defender negligently causes or permits to be created a source of
danger, and it is reasonably foreseeable that third parties may interfere with it, and
sparking off the danger, thereby cause damage to persons in the position of the pursuer."
Smith v. Littlewoods Organisation Ltd., I All ER 710, 730 (H.L. 1965) (Goff, L.J.).
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For example, commentators hypothesize that if the bar owner shows
that a monitoring system has been put in place, but it is still quite
difficult for the staff to keep a tally on the amount every customer has
had to drink (due to volume of patrons, etc.) then "less likely is the
prospect of liability being imposed.,
92
Conversely, if the patron is accompanied by others or is put into the
care of others who are responsible, then this course of action may relieve
the publican of liability. 93
Furthermore, there is also the proposition suggested by Lord Justice
Beldam in Barrett that "I am not my brother's keeper" and that it would
be "fair, just and reasonable" to impose liability. Instead, it would be
more appropriate "to leave the responsibility for 6onsuming alcohol in
the hands of the drinker., 94 Certainly, this argument, at least in cases
involving injuries caused to the patron himself, is consistent with the
doctrine of volenti nonfit injuria which has come into play in a number
of publicans' liability cases in the United Kingdom.95
IV. CONSEQUENCES AND CONCLUSIONS?
There are a number of foreseeable disadvantages to imposing a duty of
care on publicans for the acts of their intoxicated patrons. First, there may
be an understandable reluctance on the part of publicans to serve customers
more than a minimal number of drinks, to avoid liability for any accidents
linked to the consumption of the alcohol served. While this "deterrent effect"
may have the positive effect of reducing the number of accidents,
particularly road traffic accidents caused by alcohol, the imposition of a
duty of care would also result in lower revenues to the severe detriment of
small businesses. As a result of the dramatic implications of the resolution of
these issues, perhaps a legislative, rather than a judicial, solution is called for.
92. BYRNE & BINCHY, supra note 5, at 610.
93. See Munro, supra note 83.
94. Dunne, supra note 7, at 157.
95. Volenti nonfit injuria (to a willing person no injury is done). That to which a
man consents cannot be considered to be an injury. See, e.g., Morris v. Murray, 3 All
E.R. 801 (where the claimant was injured when a plane, piloted by a friend with whom
he had been drinking, crashed. His argument-that his drunkenness undermined the
defense of volenti nonfit injuria-failed because, despite being drunk, he was capable of
understanding what he was doing). Cf. Ratcliff v. McConnell, [1999] 1 W.L.R. 670
(where the 19 year-old plaintiff student was seriously injured when he dove into the
college's open-air swimming pool when swimming there with friends. The act took
place at night, when access to the pool was prohibited. Although the claimant was not
drunk, he had been drinking). See Harvey & Marston, supra note 44, at 1005.
When these cases are litigated, there will undoubtedly be pressure on
bar proprietors to settle the disputes instead.96 Inevitably, higher
insurance premiums for publicans will result and the patron will pay
more for the alcohol he consumes.
While there is no indication that the Irish Parliament (Ddil) will take
up these issues, they remain questions to be decided in Irish courts.
Whether the courts will follow the approach of their English brethren
remains to be seen. Regardless, a set of coherent principles must be
established by the judiciary so as to avoid a situation where the negative
economic consequences are visited upon small business owners.
Certainly, the scope of publicans' liability should not be permitted to be
governed by the slippery slope maxim: "If one step, why not fifty?"
96. See Cleary, supra note 31, at 7.
